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FLOWERS AND NOAH: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONFLICTING REMEDIES AFFORDED

AMPHIBIOUS EMPLOYEES
THOMAS C.

MACDONALD, JR.*

Two recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, appear to have shed new and sorely needed light on
an area of the maritime law which, unfortunately and perhaps needlessly, has been subject to confusion for over four decades. This perplexing problem is the choice of the proper workmen's compensation
act, federal or state, to apply to claims against employers by amphibious workers or their dependents for injuries or death sustained
on navigable waters. The numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States pertaining to this issue have not left the selection
of the applicable statute as simple as might appear from the now
firmly entrenched philosophy supporting such compensation statutes. 2
Noah v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.3 presented an appeal from
a judgment dismissing a mother's claim against an employer's compensation insurer under the Louisiana workmen's compensation act
for the death of her longshoreman 4 son, who was drowned when he
fell from a barge while engaged in the loading of cargo onto a vessel
lying in the Mississippi River. 5 The district court had found the
-B.S.B.A. 1951, LL.B. 1953, University of Florida; Member, Admiralty Law
Committee, The Florida Bar; Member, The Maritime Law Association of the
United States; Member of Tampa, Florida, Bar.
'Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958); Noah v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., infra note 3.
2See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §2.20 (1952); Note, 9 U. FLA. L. REv.
311 (1956).
3265 F.2d 547, overruled on rehearing en banc, 267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959).
4Despite some incorrect transposition of terminology by the authorities, a longshoreman is actually the laborer engaged in loading or unloading cargo, whereas
a stevedore is the person in authority over or in charge of the longshoremen
laborers. Corporate employers of longshoremen often are termed
Stevedoring Co." See NoRRiS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 5 (1959).
5162 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. La. 1958). This case was presented in the district
court by virtue of removal from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
there being diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the defendant compensation insurer, 28 U.S.C. §1441 (1958). (Transcript of Record on Appeal, pp.
1-10.) Such removal would no longer be permissible, 28 U.S.C. §1445 (c) (1958).
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exclusive remedy against the stevedore employer to lie under the
federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 6
A sharply divided court, Judge Wisdom dissenting,7 initially concluded that the Supreme Court's new pronouncements in Hahn v.
Ross Island Sand 8c Gravel Co.," viewed in the light of other cases
elaborating upon the twilight zone theory of concurrent federal and
9
state jurisdiction, had in effect retreated from the often berated
10
in
teachings of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. Hence the claim
question could be asserted under a state workmen's compensation
statute in spite of the fact that the similar death of a longshoreman
presented in Jensen gave rise to the classic denial of state jurisdiction
and the fact that, but for the enactment of the federal compensation
act, longshoremen would be treated as seamen. 1 Upon rehearing en
banc, the court receded from this view, sustained the trial court, and,
speaking through Judge Wisdom, held that Hahn had not overruled
Jensen by implication and that the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy to
Noah's dependent against his employer.' 2 The original majority,
Chief Judge Hutcheson and Judge Cameron, dissented. Certiorari apparently was not sought.
It may now be seriously suggested that, pending further decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States, claims arising from injuries"s on navigable waters1 4 to longshoremen loading or unloading
It is also a matter of interest that apparently a state compensation claim in
Louisiana may be initiated in a court, unlike the procedure in Florida, wherein
the proceeding is commenced before a deputy industrial commissioner. FLA. STAT.
c. 440 (1959).
644 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§901-48 (1958), herein sometimes called the
Harbor Workers' Act.
7265 F.2d at 550.
8358 U.S. 272 (1959).
9". . . a much criticized and somewhat impaired, but not overruled, decision
which held federal power exclusive and state compensation laws forbidden in an
area of 'shadowy limits.'" Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 399 (1943). See
also United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 584, 589 (1944)
(dissenting opinion); Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 309 (1943).
10244 U.S. 205 (1917).

"Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931); International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
12267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959).

13The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act extends coverage to death or disability from personal injury, 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C.
§903 (a)

(1958), "injury" including certain occupational diseases, 44
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vessels are ordinarily exclusively within the federal Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, at least as far as the federal
courts in the Fifth Circuit are concerned. 15
It seems plausible to assume that longshoremen comprise a substantial segment of maritime employees, emphasizing the practical
significance of Noah. Marine workers engaged in furthering the repair of existing vessels also constitute a sizable group of amphibious
workers potentially confronted with selection of the proper jurisdiction
for assertion of a claim against an employer.
Shortly prior to Noah, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
decided Flowers v. Travelers Insurance Co.16 A claim had been asserted in the district court for injuries sustained by a welder while
engaged in the repair of a vessel lying in a floating dry dock in the
harbor of Galveston, in the navigable waters of the United States.' 7
In a typically piercing opinion s Judge Brown, for a unanimous
bench,' 9 rejected the employee's claim, not unlike that to be later ad(1927), 33 U.S.C. §902(2) (1958). Herein reference will ordinarily be made simply
to "injury."
14This qualification is of prime importance because, as will be observed herein,
shoreside injuries are invariably encompassed by state workmen's compensation
acts. Occurrence of a tort on navigable waters is a prerequisite of admiralty
jurisdiction in a personal injury claim. See NoRRIS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 418.
"Briefly, the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extends to all waters, salt
or fresh, with or without tides, natural or artificial, which are in fact navigable
in interstate or foreign water commerce, whether or not the particular body of
water is wholly within a state, and whether or not the occurrence or transaction
that is the subject-matter of the suit is confined to one state." GiLMORRE and BLAcK,
ADmmALTY 28 (1957). See, however, 62 STAT. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. §740 (1958),
extending admiralty jurisdiction to injuries caused by vessels when done or consummated on land. The federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act extends coverage only to injuries occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States, including any dry dock. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C.
§903 (a) (1958). The term dry dock includes a marine railway. Avondale Marine
Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953).
15See note 110 infra.
16258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958). It is also noteworthy that this case was decided
before Hahn and did not consider any effects of that decision on the prevailing
law.
17Case
No. 2149, S.D. Tex., Galveston Div. Like Noah, the case was removed
after initial filing in a state court. (Transcript of record on Appeal, pp. 3-21.)
IsCf. the "judicial conflicts bus ride" in United Services Automobile Ass'n v.
Russom, 241 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1957).
leTuttle, Jones, and Brown, JJ., none of whom sat in the original hearing on
Noah. No doubt this fact, in conjunction with the apparent inconsistency of
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vanced in Noah, that the decision of the Supreme Court in Davis v.
Department of Labor20 and the subsequent "unilluminating per curiams" 21 in Bethelem Steel Co. v. Moores2 2 and Baskin v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n 23 brought the case within the so-called twilight
zone 2 4 wherein an option of selection by the employee would operate
to support his choice of the Texas workmen's compensation act.
26
25
Conflicting decisions of state courts in Louisiana and Texas supporting the claimant's position were disregarded as "fundamentally
erroneous" 27 in an area in which the federal courts are supreme. In
holding that the sole remedy for Flowers against his employer lay
under the federal statute the court commented:28
"The outlines of a case of an injury received on navigable
waters while engaged in essential repairs to an existing vessel
have long been clear and distinct. As to them, there was no
twilight. . .

. The District Judge was right in holding that

the Texas act could not apply and that this was a case for the
exclusive application of the Federal Act."
Although always an action of debatable significance, 29 it is well to
30
note that certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.
These decisions appear to require federal courts in the Fifth
Circuit to restrict claims against employers by longshoremen engaged
in loading or unloading vessels and by repairmen engaged in repairs
Flowers and the first Noah opinions, contributed to the fact that all seven members
of the court sat in the rehearing on Noah.
20317 U.S. 249 (1942).
21258 F.2d at 222.
22335 U.S. 874 (1948).
23338 U.S. 854 (1949).
24See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256 (1942).
25Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 95 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1957);
Sullivan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 So.2d 834 (La. App. 1957).
26ndemnity Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d

174

(Tex. Civ. App. 1957);

Emmons v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 146 Tex. 496, 208 S.W.2d 884 (1948).
27258 F.2d at 227.
281d. at 228.
29See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 488 (1953). For a view often expressed by
counsel and laymen see the excerpt from the employee's brief in Flowers, 258
F.2d at 228, n.22. For a rare judicial expression of the same tenor see Kraft
Foods Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 266 F.2d 254, 263 (7th Cir. 1959).
30359 U.S. 920 (1959). Mr. Justice Douglas is noted as being of the opinion

that certiorari should be granted.
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to existing vessels3 ' almost invariably to the federal statute in situations in which such workers are injured on navigable waters. As
noted, the groups involved obviously represent a large portion of
those employees likely to become confronted with the choice in issue,
and if for no other reason the decisions are important.
Although these decisions doubtless appear to reach results both
logical and, to many, unstriking, an examination of the historical
development of this conflict of state and federal remedies for maritime workers through the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States reflects the uncertainty that has existed and indicates
the need at the time Noah and Flowers were decided for a more
definitive statement of the rights of amphibious workers in such
situations.
Of what practical importance is a selection between state and federal compensation statutes, beyond the obvious frustration, expense,
and delay resulting from an erroneous choice? It is, of course, beyond the purview of this article to analyze all of the statutory provisions; it is suggested that in given instances variations between a
state statute and the federal statute will afford differences in the
identity and requisite dependence of relatives of deceased employees
competent to maintain claims, the quantum of compensation and
medical benefits payable, and applicable statutes of limitation. Moreover, variations in substantive rules of compensation law are important, for example, the law applicable to establishment of an injury
as one arising out of and in the course of employment, and therefore
32
compensable.
Before proceeding with this discussion, it is well to note that the
scope of this commentary does not encompass the rights of seamen,
but presupposes that the employees discussed are not seamen-or,
more properly, are not masters or members of the crew of a vessel33 311t is of importance to note this qualification, for, as will be seen, a contract
for the building of a ship is non-maritime, and work on an uncompleted ship
may likewise be non-maritime. See discussion under The Local Concern Doctrine
infra.
32See, e.g., 44 STAT. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §902(2) (1958); FLA. STAT.
§440.09 (1) (1959).
-sCompensation is not payable under the Harbor Workers' Act to a master or
member of a crew of any vessel. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §903 (a) (1) (1958).
The effect of the enactment of the Harbor Workers' Act was to remove longshoremen from coverage under the Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§688 (1958), a remedy for a seaman. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett,
309 U.S. 251 (1940). Hence it seems logical for the limited purpose of remedies
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and thus are not within the ambit of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, commonly known as the Jones Act

34

or the other liberal remedies

afforded to seamen against their employers under the general maritime law. Rather it represents an effort to review the overlapping or
mutual exclusion, as the case may be, of various remedies afforded
non-seamen maritime or amphibious employees against employers
under state or federal workmen's compensation statutes. The determination of whether an employee may be a seaman is in itself a complex problem; indeed, in some employment situations, dredge workers,
for example, a particular accident or injury may involve the making
of two decisions: (1) whether the injured employee is a seaman or a
member of the crew of a vessel - usually a fact question; 35 (2) whether
the circumstances of the particular injury give rise to a claim under
the state or the federal compensation act. Only the second problem
will be here considered3" The state and federal compensation acts
will often be termed simply "state act" and "federal act."
THE UNIFORMITY CONCEPT: JENSEN AND ITS OFFSPRING

All authorities trace
Co. v. Jensen,37 a case
chronology of the case
exhaustive repetition, 3 s

the origin of the problem to Southern Pacific
closely in point with Noah. Although the
law has perhaps grown too familiar to bear
it still presents an interesting account of

against employers to consider "seaman" and "member of a crew" as virtually
synonymous. See I NORRIS, SEAMEN 13-14 (1951).
3441 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958).
35
See South Chicago Coal 8: Dock Co. v. Bassett, supra note 33. A recent decision
shedding considerable light on the problem of determining what employees are
seamen is Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). See also I
NORRIS, SEAMEN §§1-19 (1951). For an indication of an even broader umbrella
of coverage for seamen under the Jones Act see Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transpor-

tation Co., 28 U.S.L. WEEK 4044 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1959).
36For varying results in dredging cases, see Radcliff Gravel Co. v. Henderson,
138 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1943) (Harbor Workers' Act applicable); Kibadeaux v.
Standard Dredging Co., 81 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1936) (Jones Act applicable); United
Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, 18 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1927) (state act applicable). See
also Comment, 32 TULANE L. REV. 292 (1958).
37244 U.S. 205 (1917). "Even Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, which fathered

the 'uniformity' concept ....

" The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 594 (1959).
(6th ed. 19,10); GIL-

3SFor text treatments see 1 BENEDIcr, ADMIRALTY §§27-31
MORE

and

BLACK

4-8 (1955); 2

§§6-45-52;

LARSON,

PERSONAL INJURIES §§132-37

review

treatments see

HANNA,

FEDERAL

REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE

INJURIES

§89 (1952); NORRIS, MARITIME
(1959); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY §§13-15 (1939). For law

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Gisevius

and

Leppert, Modern Maritime Workers, 9
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progressive judicial treatment of a modern industrial dilemma, the
study of which is doubtless necessary in order to perceive the full
significance of Flowers and Noah.
Even prior to Jensen, longshoremen's claims against employers had
concerned the Supreme Court. In 1890 the Court held in effect that
longshoremen's claims against vessels for injuries occurring on navigable waters were properly within admiralty jurisdiction. 39 Then in
1914, in Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek,"° with no compensation
act involved, the Court held that admiralty jurisdiction extended to
a claim by a longshoreman against his stevedore employer for an
injury sustained on navigable waters as the result of negligent failure
to provide a safe place to work.
In Jensen the Supreme Court, divided five to four on an employer's appeal, reversed a judgment of the Court of Appeals of New
York4' which had affirmed application of the New York workmen's
compensation statute to the claim of Jensen's widow, arising from
his death while working as a longshoreman unloading a vessel docked
L. REv. 1, 18-26 (1957-58); Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime
Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 HAuv. L. REv. 637 (1955); Comment,
67 YALE L. J. 1205 (1958). See also Bedell, What You Should Know About Maritime Torts, 38 FLA. B. J. 480, 488 (1956); Bradley, An Introduction to Admiralty
and Maritime Law, 27 INS. COUNSEL J. 51, 58-61 (1960); Creede, Injuries to Amphibious Employees: Is Jurisdiction Under the State Compensation Act or Federal
Maritime Law?, 22 INS. COUNSEL J. 42 (1955).
39The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
40234 U.S. 52 (1914). This opinion is also important in that it planted a seed
that ripened into full flower 32 years later in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85 (1946). In Imbrovek the Court remarked: "Formerly the work [loading
and unloading of cargo] was done by the ship's crew; but, owing to the exigencies
of increasing commerce and the demand for rapidity and special skill, it has
become a specialized service devolving upon a class 'as clearly identified with
maritime affairs as are the mariners.'" 234 U.S. at 62. Upon this basis the Court
in Sieracki extended to longshoremen in actions against vessels and their owners
the right to rely upon the warranty of a vessel's seaworthiness traditionally granted
to seamen. Such actions may ultimately result in indemnification of the shipowner
by the stevedore employer through third party actions, FED. R. Civ. P. 14, GEN.
ADMIRALTY R. 56, thereby in effect circumventing the limited liability feature of
the Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C. §905 (1958). See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v.
Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. PanAtlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); NoRis, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES
§§49-61 (1959).
For an able critique of the premise that loading and unloading was work
traditionally done by the crew, see Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights
of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 381 (1954).
41215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1915).
LOYOLA
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in the New York harbor. Speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds,
who was destined to write many of the later decisions focusing on
the same problem, 2 the Court found that the application of the New
York statute as a basis for an award to the widow worked material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law,
which was said to require uniformity under the constitutional delegation of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts. A classic dissent
by Holmes questioned this conclusion'4 and a foremost modern
authority has cogently pointed out the numerous applications of state
law to matters maritime with the blessing of the high tribunal. 44
Moreover, Judge Wqisdom, the ultimate voice of the court in Noah,
in accepting Jensen expressed his doubt as to the validity of its
conclusions45
While little is to be gained by further figurative flaying of this
decision, its reasoning does appear questionable in the light of the
facts then before the Court. The claim, of course, was one arising
from a death.

The general maritime law, like the common law,

6

makes no provision for recovery for death47 Within four years after
42E.g., Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930);
John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930); Northern Coal & Dock Co. v.
Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
276 U.S. 467 (1928); Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926);
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925); Gonsalves v. Morse Dry
Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. 171 (1924); Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264
U. S. 219 (1924); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479
(1923); State Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Grant
Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U.S. 233 (1921); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Peters
v. Veasey, 251 U.S. 121 (1919); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
43244 U.S. at 216. "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be
identified .. i.."
Id. at 222.
44GILMORE and BLACK, ADMIRALTY §6-45 (1957).
45265 F.2d 547, 551. But see GILMORE and BLACK 43-44: "[I]t is impossible not
to concede that the major premise they [Jensen and related cases] state is a sound
one. If there is any sense at all in making maritime law a federal subject, then
there must he some limit set to the power of the states to interfere in the field
of its working." For an example of the difficulties in application of state law in
maritime matters, see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co., 348 U.S.
310 (1955).
46E.g., Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921).
47E.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886). However, recent divided decisions of the Court, e.g., The Tungus
v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), may foreshadow far reaching innovations in
connection with remedies for death in admiralty.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss1/2

8

MacDonald: Flowers and Noah: New Developments in Conflicting Remedies Afford
FLOWERS AND NOAH
the Jensen case the Supreme Court in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,4
again through Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that in view of this
lack of provision in the general maritime law, a state wrongful death
statute might be utilized as a vehicle for admiralty to entertain a
libel in personam against a stevedore employer for the death of a
longshoreman on navigable waters within a state, a prior claim under
the state compensation act having been dismissed under authority
of Jensen.
It is difficult to accept the premise that the utilization of a state
wrongful death statute in one instance, and the utilization of a statute
allowing recovery for death within the framework of a state workmen's compensation act in another, should be so remarkably different
as to reconcile Western Fuel and Jensen. Perhaps the prejudice of
Jensen might be found in the fact that liability without fault is a
48257 U.S. 233 (1921). For an indication that application of state law in the
case of death in the state's navigable waters may validly include application of a
standard of care higher than that imposed by the general maritime law, see Hess
v. United States, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 4058 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1960). The Jones Act precludes enforcement of state death acts against employers of seamen. Lindgren v.
United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930). This would seem to rule out any efforts to
advance claims under a state death act against employers for the death of a seaman
allegedly resulting from breach of a warranty of seaworthiness, as has been done
in non-seaman cases under some state death acts, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard,
358 U.S. 588 (1959). The Florida act, FiA. STAT. §768.01 (1959), has been interpreted as not encompassing a death claim based on unseaworthiness, Graham v.
A. Lusi, Ltd., 206 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953); but the Graham case does not appear
to have considered the amendment to the statute by Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28280, §1.
See 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 344 (1952). However, Chief Judge Whitehurst of the
Southern District of Florida, without discussion of the amendment, has recently
reaffirmed the rule of Graham in a case of a seaman's death subsequent to the
amendment and has moreover held the state death act inapplicable to a claim
for the death of a seaman, asserted in that instance against the vessel in rem. de
Hyman v. The Montego, No. 549 Adm-T, S.D. Fla., Tampa Div., Dec. 23, 1959.
The exclusive liability provisions of state and federal compensation acts rule out
application of state death acts against employers covered by those statutes, e.g.,
44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §905 (1958), although it is not inconceivable that
rejection of a compensation act in advance of injury and death, as in Hahn v. Ross
Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959), might furnish an area for the application of such statutes. The federal Death on the High Seas Act, 41 STAT. 537
(1920), 46 U.S.C. §§761-68 (1958), does cover any death occurring on the high
seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any state, but does not prevail
over a state compensation act. King v. Pan American World Airways, 270 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1959), petition for certiorari pending, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3237 (1960).
Hence the rule of Western Fuel should not now be of great importance in employee-employer actions.
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feature of the workmen's compensation act. If this be so, assuredly
this feature has not troubled later courts, because liability without
fault has become a keynote of personal injury and death remedies in
other maritime situations presented to the Supreme Court. 49 The

latter point is perhaps also debatable, since maintenance and cure,
a species of responsibility without fault, has long been known to the
admiralty law. 5° However, some basis for this belief may be found in
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,31 in which the Court, citing Jensen,
did in effect hold that common law standards of liability do not extend to admiralty, indicating that no state has the power to abolish
well-recognized maritime rules concerning measure of recovery and
substitute rules of the common law.
In any event, regardless of the validity of its conclusion or the
explanation for its holding, adherence to Jensen in cases of longshoremen injured on navigable waters was shortly found in Peters v.
Veasey. 52 Indeed, though often assailed and destined to be limited
by the local concern and twilight zone doctrines, the holding of
Jensen has actually never been overruled. With particular reference
to Noah, the Supreme Court, as will be seen, does not appear to have
retreated from the Jensen holding in a longshoreman case.
THE FEDERAL COMPENSATION ACT

Amphibious workers confronted with the Jensen holding found
themselves lacking the ready remedy for industrial injuries accorded

shoreside workers, who were not required to demonstrate fault of the
employers, as were amphibious workers proceeding under Imbrovek.
Apparently desirous of solving this quandary by extending to state
workmen's compensation statutes the area of operation denied by
Jensen, the Congress twice amended the "saving to suitors" clause of
the Judiciary Act 53 to provide the states an avenue to pursue in
49E.g., the warranty of seaworthiness by the owner of a vessel. See NORRIS,
§30 (1959). A humorous commentary on this subject is found
in the remarks by the Honorable Bailey Aldrich, United States District Judge
for the District of Massachusetts, on "The Training of an Admiralty Judge" given
at the fall dinner meeting of The Maritime Law Association of the United States,
New York, Nov. 14, 1958; see Document No. 423 of the Association at 4377, 4378.
5OSee The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
51247 U.S. 372 (1918).
52251 U.S. 121 (1919).
531 STAT. 76-77 (1789), now 28 U.S.C. §1333 (1958).
MARITIME INJURIES
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utilizing their workmen's compensation statutes in such situations."4
The semantic exercises of the Congress and the Court are history, and
it is a sufficient epitaph to say that in both instances congressional
efforts were appropriately eulogized as they were laid to rest as
victims of the uniformity doctrine.55 In Washington v. W. C. Dawson
& Co. a thinly veiled hint was made to the Congress that a federal
statute might be the answer. 5
This bit of judicial advice was eventually heeded with the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act in 1927. 5 7 This statute, patterned on the New York act 5 - provides
federal workmen's compensation benefits in all instances of claims
against employers59 for injury or death when they occur on navigable
waters or on a dry dock, and when state workmen's compensation
proceedings might not validly provide recovery.60 A master and the
members of a crew of a vessel are excluded,61 the latter employees,
of course, possessing rights under the Jones Act 2 and rights otherwise
granted seamen under the general maritime law.63 Also excluded are
persons engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small
(1917); 42 STAT. 634 (1922).
55Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
56264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924).
5744 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1958).
5sSee 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §89.10 (1952).
59"The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock)." 44 STAT. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C.
§902 (4) (1958).
6044 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §903 (a) (1958). It is to be noted that Congress did not follow the simplest choice of placing all injuries on navigable
waters under the federal compensation act, but only those constitutionally beyond
the reach of the state. See GILMORE and BLAcK 346.
6144 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §903 (a) (1) (1958). This exclusion was at
the specific urging of seamen's groups. See GILMORE and BLAcK 338 and cases
cited. For a suggestion, perhaps not designed to be received with favor by shipowners or P & I underwriters, that seamen be afforded rights under the Harbor
Workers' Act and still retain rights to bring tort actions against employers, see
Gardner, Remedies for PersonalInjuries to Seamen, Railroadmen, and Longshoremen, 71 HARv. L. REv. 438 (1958).
6241 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958).
63
See Maihnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158 (1903). See, however, Lovitt, Things Are Seldom What They Seem: The Jolly
Little Wards of the Admiralty, 46 A.B.A.J. 171 (1960), a humorous criticism of
the liberal treatment afforded seamen's claims.
5440 STAT. 395
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vessel under eighteen tons net.64 The Supreme Court has held that

in enacting this statute Congress adopted the Jensen line of demarcation between state and federal compensation acts;65 that is to
say, the provision of the federal act limiting its coverage to situations
in which a state act could not validly apply in effect adopted Jensen
as a measure for the valid application of a state act. In theory, two
mutually exclusive areas of operations should have devolved, as
separate if not as distant as great Birnam wood and high Dunsinane hill;66 indeed, such a result should have inhered from Jensen
even without the enactment of the Harbor Workers' Act. It will be
observed that it did not.
In examination of the factors leading to the passage of the Harbor
Workers' Act, it is well to note International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty,67 which came before the Court after the congressional efforts
to eradicate the Jensen rule had been ruled invalid. At this time,
before the passage of the Harbor Workers' Act, Jensen and its progeny
precluded amphibious employees not saved by the local concern
doctrine, which will shortly be examined, from proceeding under
state workmen's compensation acts for injuries on navigable waters.
Rather they were relegated to claims against their employers under
the admiralty law in accordance with Imbrovek. Longshoreman
Haverty's claim arose from the negligence of a fellow servant, for
which the employer was not responsible under the general maritime
law.6 8 However, the Jones Act abrogating the fellow servant rule as

to seamen had been passed in 1920.69 Thus unless longshoremen
were within the ambit of the Jones Act their rights against their
employers were sorely impeded by the fellow servant rule. In Haverty
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, noting as it did in
Imbrovek that the work of a stevedore was maritime service formerly
rendered by the crew, concluded that Congress must have intended
longshoremen, although not seamen for most purposes, to be considered as seamen within the coverage of the Jones Act.
STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §903 (a) (1) (1958).
65Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 312 U.S. 244 (1941).

6444

66SIIAKESPEARE, MACBETH,

Act IV, Scene 1.

67272 U.S. 50 (1926).

68Sec The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
69The Jones Act adopted for seamen by reference the rights and remedies of
railway employees under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908),
45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1958), which abolished the fellow servant defense. See GILMORE
and BLACK §6-54; NORRIS, MARITIME INJURIES §21 (1959).
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The effects of this decision, of course, were short lived because of
the passage the next year of the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. Today longshoremen and other employees encompassed within the Harbor Workers' Act have no rights
against their employers under the Jones Act or the general maritime
law.70 This is true not only for injuries sustained on navigable
waters but also for shoreside injuries,71 despite the fact that the
Jones Act may extend to injuries of seamen on land.72 Further, only
73
true seamen may assert the ancient right to maintenance and cure.
However, longshoremen and others performing work traditionally
that of the crew have been entitled, at least since 1946, to hold a
vessel owner to the warranty of the vessel's seaworthiness extended
to seamen. 74 The holding in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki75 extending
this remedy to longshoremen was based on the premise of Imbrovek
and Haverty that longshoremen perform traditional work of the
crew.
THE LOCAL CONCERN DOCTRINE
During the unsuccessful congressional efforts to return to the
states the right to utilize workmen's compensation statutes for injuries on navigable waters, the "local concern" doctrine, a judicial
effort in the same direction, saw the light of day in Grant SmithPorter Ship Co. v. Rohde.76 It was held that a carpenter injured on
a ship under construction in navigable waters in Oregon could not
maintain a libel in admiralty against his employer because of the
exclusive provision of the state workmen's compensation law; the
thesis of the Court was that the contract for shipbuilding and the
contract of the employment were non-maritime 77 and basically matters
of local concern. Thus Jensen's area of exclusion of state statutes
INJURIES §21 (1959).
7lSwanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
720'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
73See GILmIIRE and BLAcK §6-7.
74United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). For
a listing of those workers performing traditional crew's work see NoRRIs, MARITIME INJURIES §48A (1959). But see West v. United States, 28 U.S.L. W.EK 4091
(U.S. Dec. 7, 1959).
75328 U.S. 85 (1946).
76257 U.S. 469 (1922).
77See The People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857).

70See NoRRs, MARIIME
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did not extend to such essentially local or non-maritime employment.
Only a case by case study can fully demonstrate the workers classified
as local. A good example is found in Millers' Indemnity Underwriters
v. Braud7s in which the local concern doctrine was determined to be
applicable to a diver drowned while suspended from a barge to saw
timbers. This doctrine was followed in several decisions,7 9 but of
course the need to find a basis upon which to escape Jensen and to
afford compensation benefits for injuries on navigable waters was
theoretically gone with the enactment of the Harbor Workers' Act.
In any event, the doctrine does not seem to have been applied by the
Court to repairmen on existing vessels or to longshoremen. Indeed,
despite the growth of the local concern doctrine, support of Jensen
continued in the non-application of state statutes to repairmen working on existing vessels.so It is moreover well to remember that Rohde
involved work on a ship under construction and not a completed
ship under repair, as did Flowers.
Even during the heyday of the local concern doctrine the Court
continued to adhere to the view that longshoremen's claims for injuries on navigable waters could not be asserted under state statutes.,'
This thesis was further echoed in Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.
R.R.,82 in which it was held that a freight handler injured on a railroad car float was relegated to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act and could not sue under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,

3

the usual remedy of railroad employees. The Court, in

declaring that the general scheme of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act was to provide compensation to employees engaged in
78270 U.S. 59 (1926).

79Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v. Department of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928),
affirming 141 Wash. 172, 251 Pac. 130 (1926) (logging operations); Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467 (1928), affirning 200 Cal. 579,
253 Pac. 926 (1927) (cannery worker pushing boat into water); Rosengrant v.
Havard, 273 U.S. 664 (1927), affirming 213 Ala. 202, 104 So. 409 (1925) (lumber
checker); State Industrial Bd. v. Terry & Tinch Co., 273 U.S. 639 (1926), reversing
240 N.Y. 292, 148 N.E. 527

(1925) (claimant engaged in pier construction).

s0John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930); Messel v. Foundation
Co., 274 U.S. 427 (1927); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449
(1925); Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. 171 (1924); Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1923).
slUravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931); Employers' Liability Assurance
Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930); Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278
U.S. 142 (1928).
82281 U.S. 128 (1930).
8335 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1958).
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maritime employment, stated: "But seamen, including longshoremen engaged in loading or unloading, if injured on a vessel in
navigable waters, could not constitutionally have the benefits of a
state workmen's compensation act, even if an act of Congress so provided."8s
As late as 1935 it was held that the claim of a longshoreman
struck by a hoist while unloading a ship and knocked from the ship
to the dock properly came under the federal act and could not be
asserted under the state statute.8 5 An interesting sidelight is the
fact that seven years earlier the Court found the state act applicable
to the death of a longshoreman who drowned after being knocked
from a wharf into the Mississippi River by a cargo sling.86
THE TWILIGHT ZONE

In the early 1940's it was thus clear that while some injuries occurring on navigable waters, including those resulting from construction work on uncompleted vessels, were within state acts by
virtue of the local concern doctrine, injuries occurring in navigable
waters or in a dry dock to longshoremen and to workers repairing
existing vessels were almost invariably within the federal statute. In
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc. 7

the Court, however, speaking

through Mr. Justice Black, who was to become the blazer of as
broad a path in this field as Mr. Justice McReynolds, held in effect
that federal jurisdiction validly extended to a compensation claim
for a janitor who ordinarily worked on land but was killed while
riding in a boat. The Court indicated that the fact that his work was
habitually done on land was irrelevant. This opinion might well
have started a reconsideration of the local concern rule, because the
facts at hand clearly fell within that rule. However, the case was
shortly to be followed by a new means of giving effect to state acts,
again without overruling Jensen.
The doctrine of the "twilight zone" 's8 was enunciated in 1942
84281 U.S. at 135.
ssMinnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
86T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928). See also State Industrial
Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922), holding state compensation act
to apply to death of longshoreman on a dock.
87314 U.S. 244 (1941).
8sThis expression of course refers, at least to date, to an area of alleged concurrent action between the state and federal compensation acts, and not to any
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in Davis v. Department of Labor, 9 in which the Court held that a
claim for the death of a worker handling steel on a barge during the
dismantling of a bridge was validly asserted under the state statute.
For the first time enunciating the "theoretic illogic" 90 of the twilight
zone, Mr. Justice Black stated: 91
"There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a
twilight zone in which the employees must have their rights
determined case by case, and in which particular facts and
circumstances are vital elements. That zone includes persons
such as the decedent who are, as a matter of actual administration, in fact protected under the state compensation act.
"Faced with this factual problem we must give great indeed, presumptive - weight to the conclusions of the appropriate federal authorities and to the state statutes themselves.
Where there has been a hearing by the federal administrative
agency entrusted with broad powers of investigation, fact
finding, determination, and award, our task proves easy. There
we are aided by the provision of the federal act, 33 U. S. C. A.
§920, which provides that in proceedings under that act, jurisdiction is to be 'presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary.' Fact findings of the agency, where supported
by the evidence, are made final. Their conclusion that a case
falls within the federal jurisdiction is therefore entitled to
great weight and will be rejected only in cases of apparent
error....
"....
We find here a state statute which purports to cover
these persons, and which indeed does cover them if doubtful
and difficult factual questions to which we have referred are
decided on the side of the constitutional power of the state.
The problem here is comparable to that in another field of
constitutional law in which courts are called upon to determine whether particular state acts unduly burden interstate commerce. In making the factual judgment there, we have
relied heavily on the presumption of constitutionality in favor
of the state statute."
similar area between compensation acts and the Jones Act. See GILMORE and
BLACK 356.
89317 U.S. 249 (1942).
9
OSee id. at 259 (concurring opinion).
9Id. at 256.
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Davis presented an entirely new approach to the problem; in fact,
the Court has since indicated that it introduced a concept of an area
of overlapping jurisdiction. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has described the Davis doctrine as "'the first come first served'
93
rule."
While the "twilight zone" might have solved some problems from
a practical standpoint, it doubtless also created the one of locating
not one but two lines of demarcation and thus the twilight zone between. The difficulties incident to the twilight zone were exemplified
in the perplexing actions taken by the Supreme Court in Bethlehem
95
Steel Co. v. Moores94 and Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n.
In Moores the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in affirming
the allowance of state workmen's compensation benefits to a rigger
injured on a vessel being repaired in a floating dry dock, 96 offered
this often quoted analysis of the twilight zone: 97
"It would seem, therefore, that although apparently some
heed must still be paid to the line between State and Federal authority as laid down in the cases following the Jensen
case, the most important question has now become the fixing
of the boundaries of the new 'twilight zone,' and for this the
case gives us no rule or test other than the indefinable and
subjective test of doubt. Mr. Justice Frankfurter says that
'Theoretic illogic is inevitable so long as the employee . . .is
permitted to recover' at his choice under either act. 317 U.S.
at page 259, 63 S.Ct. at page 230. Probably therefore our
proper course is not to attempt to reason the matter through
and to reconcile previous authorities, or to preserve fine lines
of distinction, but rather simply to recognize the futility of
attempting to reason logically about 'illogic,' and to regard
the Davis case as intended to be a revolutionary decision
deemed necessary to escape an intolerable situation and as
designed to include within a wide circle of doubt all water
front cases involving aspects pertaining both to the land and
to the sea where a reasonable argument can be made either
92Hahn v. Ross Island Sand and Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959).
93De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1944).
94335 U.S. 874 (1948).
95338 U.S. 854 (1949).
9OMoores's Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948).
071d. at 167, 80 N.E.2d at 480.
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way, even though a careful examination of numerous previous
decisions might disclose an apparent weight of authority one
way or the other. We can see no other manner in which the
Davis case can be given the effect that we must suppose the
court intended it should have, and we must assume that the
court intends to follow that case in the future."
The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam,98 citing the Davis case. This
action, of course, was a clear step away from the earlier views of
repairmen claims, and one strongly relied on by the employee in
Flowers.

Prior to the Supreme Court's action in Moores, an intermediate
appellate court in California in Baskin held that a materialman injured on a ship being repaired in navigable waters was not within
the state act, Davis notwithstanding.99 This seems in line with earlier
decisions of the Court. The Supreme Court reversed per curiam for
reconsideration in the light of Moores and Davis1° ° On further review the California court held that the Supreme Court must have
considered the case to be within the twilight zone. 10' This ruling was
subsequently summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court,10 2 a still
further departure from earlier doctrine relating to claims of repairmen.
Thus the combined effect of these none too enlightening decisions
was to convey the impression that the twilight zone was exceedingly
broad and encompassed repairmen claims, leading other courts to
depart further from Jensen and its successors to find longshoremen
within the twilight zone.'0 3 This problem was compounded by perplexing denials of certiorari.10
New Light in the Twilight Zone
Although the Court has not yet clarified these problems of the
twilight zone jurisdiction, nevertheless in Pennsylvania R.R. v.
98335 U.s. 874 (1948).
99Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 P.2d 549
(1949).
100338 U.S. 854 (1949).
lOBaskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 97 Cal. App.2d 257, 217 P.2d 733
(1950).
102Kaiser Co. v. Baskin, 340 U.S. 886 (1950).
102Cases cited note 25 supra.
104Sullivan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 So.2d 834 (La. App. 1957); Richard v.
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O'Rourke,10 5 a case relied on by Judge Brown in Flowers, it reaffirmed
its position that the Harbor Workers' Act and the Jones Act together
cover all maritime employees beyond constitutional reach of the
state. There, as in Nogueira, considering the issue as to whether the
Harbor Workers' Act or the Federal Employers' Liability Act applied to the claim of a freight brakeman injured on a moored car
float, the Court indicated that in any event state jurisdiction could
not validly apply. Concerning the Harbor Workers' Act the Court
stated:106
"Section 902 (4) requires the employer to pay compensation if
he has 'any' employees so engaged. If, then, the accident occurs on navigable waters, the act must apply if the injured
longshoreman was there in furtherance of his employer's business, irrespective of whether he himself can be labeled
'maritime.'
Certainly a literal reading of O'Rourke supports the conclusion
that despite the earlier twilight zone rationale, longshoremen injured on navigable waters are exclusively subjects of federal jurisdiction. Judge Brown's adoption of this concept for repairmen claims
seems equally logical, albeit not supported by the facts in O'Rourke
and indeed contrary to Baskin and Moores.
Of great significance for the future are these words in Flowers,
reviewing O'Rourke:0o
"It added the further and entirely new concept that where
coverage of §903 (a) is applicable, the exclusive liability of
§905 does not depend on the nature or character of the work
being done by the injured employee so long as (1) that injury
occurs on navigable waters and (2) the employer is such a
person 'any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any drydock),' §902 (4). Flowers'
rights under the Act for an injury admittedly received on naviLake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 95 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1957), cert. denied, 555
U.S. 952 (1958).
105344 U.S. 354 (1953).
1061d, at 341.
307258 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1958).
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gable waters while engaged in the performance of his duties
depended, not upon his own status (even though it was purely
maritime in nature), but rather upon the fact that his employer, Todd Shipyards Corporation, had 'any . . .employees'
engaged in maritime employment."
This "any employee" test, however, suggested by O'Rourke and
approved and expanded in Flowers, furnishes a clue that a liberal
construction of the federal statute will be given by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On the other hand, this concept,
though doubtless a workable theory, may prove unnecessarily broad.
For example, would the court extend the federal act to a secretarial
employee of a shipyard injured while on board a vessel under repair
merely to summon an executive to a telephone?
In 1959 came Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co.,o 8 the
latest milestone on this long trail through the rulings of the Supreme
Court, which gave rise to the original majority view in Noah. It
held in effect that an oiler on a dredge, with a claim within the twilight zone, in pursuing a state remedy could pursue a common law
action against his employer where this was permitted under the provisions of the state workmen's compensation act when the employer
had rejected the state act. Of course this result would not follow
if the action were not one originally falling within the twilight zone.
While this may have been overlooked by the original majority in
Noah, it would appear that the ultimate majority has correctly
limited Hahn to the facts there involved.
It is submitted that the original construction of Hahn in the
Noah case was not well taken. Hahn did not deal with a longshoreman
but with a worker within the twilight zone; it allowed him to exercise his remedy under the Oregon workmen's compensation statute,
which, because of the employer's rejection of the act, consisted of a
common law action. This was too tenuous a basis to rely upon in extending the twilight zone to longshoremen. Indeed, if longshoremen
are in the twilight zone, it is suggested that the zone exists no more;
all will be darkness or light according to the eye of the beholder, and
a virtually complete overlapping system of federal and state compensation statutes will have come into being. As long as Jensen, with its
head bloody but unbowed, remains law this may not constitutionally
or logically be done.
108358 U.S.

272 (1959).
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In Flowers the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on
O'Rourke, has rejected the argument that the twilight zone encompasses repairmen engaged in repairs to existing vessels; and in Noah
this court has likewise denied that the twilight zone, as allegedly revitalized by Hahn and extended by state courts, includes claims for
injuries on navigable waters by longshoremen engaged in loading or
unloading vessels. 10 9 These results are salutary and bring some certainty into an area already the subject of needless confusion resulting
from the unenlightening holdings in Baskin and Moores, as weighed
in the light of earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, and from certain state decisions on longshoremen claims. There can be no question, of course, that there are myriad other types of amphibious employees whose status is still subject to dispute under the twilight zone
theory, which by no means has been abrogated by Flowers and Noah.
Moreover, state courts, pending definitive action by the Supreme
Court of the United States, remain unfettered by Flowers and Noah
and free to find other answers in the judicial maze commenced by
Jensen.110
109Any doubt of the intended import of Flowers and Noah was laid to rest
by this dictum of the Fifth Circuit (Jones, Brown, and Wisdom, JJ.) in Atlantic
& Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, No. 18039, Jan. 18, 1960: "[T]his Court has
now firmly ruled that maritime injuries to one engaged in the classic occupation
of a longshoreman loading or unloading a vessel, and one engaged in repair of
an existing vessel are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Act, not
." Timely petition for rehearing en banc was filed and
that of a state ....
remained to be ruled upon at the time this article was submitted to the printer.
il0An exposition of the situation now prevailing in Louisiana, where in spite
of Flowers and Noah state courts continue to follow Richard v. Lake Charles
Stevedores, Inc., 95 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1957), in accepting jurisdiction of longshoremen claims asserted under the state act, is found in T. Smith & Son, Inc. v.
Williams, No. 17959, Feb. 17, 1960, wherein the Fifth Circuit (Tuttle, Brown, and
Wisdom, JJ.) held that a federal district court was precluded by the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1958), from enjoining compensation proceedings
instituted by a longshoreman in a state court under the state act following a
determination by the federal deputy compensation commissioner that the case
was properly under the federal act. The court commented, "Flowers and Noah are
not the last word on the subject, only the latest word. The twilight zone cases
are close enough, the Supreme Court is divided enough, and there is uncertainty
enough as to the choice of controlling policies in federal-state conflicts over compensation for waterfront workers, to justify resolution of the issue through the
state court route. That is the view of Louisiana courts. Right or wrong, it is
entitled to deference by federal courts." The time allowed for filing petition for
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Abolition of the twilight zone, even by complete and radical action, would be justified. However, only a re-examination of Jensen
by the Supreme Court, or a congressional extension of the federal
compensation act to encompass all injuries on navigable waters, could
accomplish that result. Meanwhile, any certainty is welcome, and if
any workers logically and constitutionally should be said to be almost
invariably within the federal statute, it is suggested that Noah and
Flowers have correctly identified them.

rehearing had not expired when this article was written. Note, however, that
the Fifth Circuit has held in Atlantic 9: Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, supra
note 109, that a federal district court may compel a federal deputy compensation
commissioner to conduct a hearing to determine whether the Harbor Workers'
Act encompasses a particular claim of an employee even in the absence of a formal
claim. The practical effects of these latest cases in providing assistance in solving
the problem now prevailing in Louisiana should be closely observed. Meanwhile
it is to be hoped that no such conflict among the courts develops in Florida, and
that more certainty will be injected into the question by the Supreme Court or
Congress.
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